

SEMINARIO DE ECONOMÍA

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Título:

“Strategy-proof location of public facilities”

Ponente:

Jorge Alcalde Unzu

(Universidad Pública de Navarra)

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Organiza:

Departamentos de Economía Aplicada; Estadística e Investigación Operativa; Matemáticas.

Coa colaboración de:



<http://seminariodeeconomia.webs.uvigo.es/>

Strategy-proof location of public facilities

Jorge Alcalde

Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract

Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules for these cases, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, with the peak or dip situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.